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Benesis: Criminal Procedure

CASE SUMMARIES

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
MACFARLANE v. WALTER
179 F.3D 1131 (9TH eIR. 1999)

I. INTRODUCTION

In Macfarlane v. Walter/ the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Washington state and
county early-release credit systems for prisoners violate the
2
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
The early-release credit systems unconstitutionally provide
fewer early-release credits to pre-trial detainees who cannot
afford to post bail than to similarly-situated prisoners who
post bail and serve their entire sentences after trial in state
prison. 3 The court held that awarding fewer good behavior
credits for time served in county jail than for time served in
state prison denies equal protection of the law to pre-trial de-

1 Macfarlane v. Walter, 179 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1999). The appeal from the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington was argued and submitted on October 5, 1998 before Circuit Judges Otto R. Skopil, Stephen Reinhardt, and
Susan P. Graber. The decision was filed May 5, 1999 and amended June 9, 1999.
Judge Reinhardt authored the opinion.

2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. ("[N]or shall any State ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
3

See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1142 (1999).

167
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tainees who serve part of their sentences in county jail due to
lack of funds to post bail, because the court found no relationship between the state's purpose of maintaining prisoner disci4
pline and offering fewer good behavior credits. However, in
the case of good performance credits, the court held that excluding pre-trial detainees from earning good performance
credits for participation in work or treatment programs does
not deny equal protection of the law because there is a relationship between the state's purpose of preventing flight from
prosecution and excluding pre-trial detainees from participating in off-site work or treatment programs. 5
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner-appellant Donald Macfarlane was sentenced to
concurrent terms6 of six years for possession of a controlled
substance and eight months for assault in the third degree. 7
Petitioner-appellant James Fogle was sentenced to five years
for possession of a controlled substance. a Both were detained
in county jails before their trials and sentencing. 9 Macfarlane

4 See id. Good behavior credits are automatically awarded to prisoners who have no
incidents of misbehavior during a specified number of days. See id. at 1135 n.l

5 See id. at 1143. Good performance credits can be earned only by participating in
work, education, or treatment programs. See id. at 1135 n.l
6 Concurrent terms are two or more prison sentences assessed against the same
person but running simultaneously so that the time served is credited to each sentence. A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (Bryan A. Garner ed., Oxford University Press, Inc. 1987).

7

See In re Fogle, 904 P.2d 722,728 n.l (1995).

a See id.
9

It was not clearly established in the Washington Court of Appeals or Washington
Supreme Court why Macfarlane and Fogle did not post bail. The Washington Supreme Court noted that "both defendants were held on separate fugitive warrants,"
which may have rendered them ineligible for bail. See id. at 726. However, on a petition for discretionary review, the Washington Supreme Court was compelled to construe the facts in the light most favorable to petitioners and, therefore, accepted their
contention that they were detained pre-trial solely for lack of funds to post bail. See
id. It was more favorable to petitioners' position for the court to accept indigence as
the basis for their pre-trial detention because the disparate treatment of pre-trail
detainees based on poverty warranted intermediate scrutiny rather than mere rational basis review. See In re Mota, 788 P.2d 538, 543 (1990). Respondent county jails
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spent 144 days in Clark County Jail, and Fogle spent 102 days
10
in Pierce County Jai1. Because the county jails offered fewer
early-release credit than state prisons, Macfarlane and Fogle
earned fewer early-release credit in county jail than they
would have earned if they had posted bail and served their en11
tire sentences post-trial in state prison.
Based on the discrepancy in early-release credit, Macfarlane and Fogle filed personal restraint petitions with the
Washington Court of Appeals. 12 The petitioners alleged that
they were being held in prison illegally, in violation of the
equal protection clause. 13
A criminal sentence must be credited one day for each day
the defendant actually served before trial. 14 Further, the
Washington statute allows a criminal sentence to be reduced
by credits earned for good behavior and for good performance. 15
Early-release credits for good behavior and good performance
are calculated differently by the state prisons, operated by the

did not challenge the Washington Supreme Court's assumption that petitioners were
detained pre-trial solely due to lack of funds to post bail and thus could not challenge
the assumption on appeal. See Macfarlane v. Walter, 179 F.3d 1131,1136 n.5 (9th Cir.
1999).
10
11

See Fogle, 904 P.2d at 725.
See Macfarlane v. Walter, 179 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999).

12

See id. at 1137. The Latin phrase habeas corpus, means: "you should have the
body," a personal restraint petition requests the court to determine whether the petitioner's imprisonment is illegal. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner ed., West
Publ'g Co. 1996).
13
14

See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1137.
See Fogle, 904 P.2d at 725 (citing In re Williams, 853 P.2d 444 (1993».

~

.

See Washington Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, Wash. Rev. Code 9.94A.150(1)
("The eS-med early release time shall be for good behavior and good performance, as
determined by the correctional agency having jurisdiction."). Good behavior credits
are automatically awarded to prisoners who have no incidents of misbehavior during a
specified number of days. Prisoners receive the maximum good behavior credits unless they lose credits for misbehavior. In contrast to the automatic good behavior
credits, prisoners earn good performance credits only for proactive participation in
work, education, or treatment programs. See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1135 n.1.
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Washington Department of Corrections (DOC), than they are
16
by the county jails, operated by local county governments.
The DOC awards state prisoners one day of good behavior
credit for every three days served, with a possible reduction of
up to one quarter of the sentence. 17 The DOC also awards
state prisoners up to one day of good performance credit for
every six days served if they participate in work, education, or
treatment programs. 18 Good behavior and good performance
credits are then combined to allow total early release credits
19
up to the statutory maximum of one third of the sentence.
In contrast to the twenty-five percent good behavior credits
available to state prisoners, the Clark and Pierce County jails
only offered good behavior credits up to fifteen percent of the
20
sentence. Moreover, pre-trial detainees in Clark and Pierce
County jails were completely ineligible for good performance
credits. 21 The discrepancy resulted in state prisoners earning
early-release credit at nearly twice the rate of county pre-trial
22
.
det alnees.
Macfarlane and Fogle both earned maximum good behavior
credit while in county jail, one day of credit for every 5 2/3 days

16 The Washington Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 provides that "earned early release time shall be for good behavior and good performance. as determined by the
correctional agency having jurisdiction." Wash. Rev. Code 9.94A.150(1) (emphasis
added). See Macfarlane at 1135.
17

See Macfarlane. 179 F.3d at 1135.
18 See id.
19

See Wash. Rev. Code 9.94A.150(1).

20

See Macfarlane. 179 F.3d at 1135-1136. A 15% reduction translates into fifteen
days of good behavior credit for every eighty-five days served. or a ratio of one day
earned for every 5 213 days served compared with the state prison good behavior ratio
of one day earned for every three days served. The Ninth Circuit decision noted that
Pierce County has since brought its good behavior policy into conformity with ~e DOC
so that inmates are now eligible for good behavior credits of up to 113 of their sentence.
See id. at 1135 n.2.
21

See id. at 1136. Pre-trial detainees in Clark and Pierce County jails were not allowed to participate in work programs and were thus prevented from earning any good
performance credits.
22

See id.
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of good behavior. 23 If Macfarlane and Fogle had served their
entire sentences post-trial in state prison, they would have
earned one day of credit for every three days of good behavior. 24
Thus, if Macfarlane had been able to post bail and serve his
entire sentence post-trial in state prison, he would have been
released from custody twenty-seven days sooner.25 Fogle would
have been released from custody seventeen days sooner had he
served his entire sentence post-trial in state prison. 26
Macfarlane and Fogle filed personal restraint petitions with
the Washington Court of Appeals alleging that the earlyrelease credit policies governing pre-trial detainees denied
them equal protection of the law. 27 The Court of Appeals
granted Fogle's petition. 28 However, the court denied Fogle's

23

See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1136. Macfarlane served 144 pre-sentence days with
good behavior at the rate of one day of credit for every 5 213 days of good behavior.
Thus, the county jail should have awarded Macfarlane 25 days of early-release credit.
Macfarlane was awarded only 21 days of early-release credit. Although Macfarlane
did not challenge the county jail's calculation of 21 days, the Ninth Circuit noted that
21 days was a miscalculation. Macfarlane should have received 25 days of earlyrelease credit for 144 days of good behavior. See id. at 1136 n.7. Fogle served 102 presentence days with good behavior at the rate of one day of credit for every 5 213 days of
good behavior. Thus, the county jail should have awarded Fogle 18 days of earlyrelease credit. Fogle was first awarded only 15 days of early-release credit. After
Fogle challenged the county jail's original award, the Washington Court of Appeals
awarded him 17 days, but this calculation was also incorrect. The Ninth Circuit noted
that Fogle should have received 18 days of early-release credit for 102 days of good
behavior. See id. at 1136 n.6.

24
See Macfarlane,
25

179 F.3d at 1135.

See id. Macfarlane would have earned 48 days of credit for 144 days of good behavior in state prison, instead of the 21 days' credit he received from county jail, a
difference of 27 days.
26 See id. Fogle would have earned 34 days of credit for 102 days of good beh,vior
in state prison, exactly twice as much early-release credit as the 17 days he earned in
county jail.

27

See id. at 1137. Macfarlane and Fogle claimed that the state denied them equal
protection of the law by denying them the opportunity to earn early-release credits of
up to 113 of their sentences on par with their counterparts in state prison.

28

See Fogle, 904 P.2d at 725. Fogle's petition was granted because of Pierce
County jail's erroneous calculation of 15 days' early-release credit for 102 days of good
behavior. Even the Court of Appeals miscalculated the credit, awarding Fogle only 17
days' credit, still one day short of the 18 he was due. See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1136
n.6.
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equal protection claim because county jails have statutory
authority to develop and implement early-release policies. 29
Fogle petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for discre·
. 30
reVIew.
t lonary
The Washington Supreme Court granted Fogle's petition
and certified Macfarlane's petition, which had not yet been de3t
cided by the court of appeals. The court subjected Macfarlane's and Fogle's equal protection claims to intermediate scrutiny, which it reluctantly conceded was merited by the wealthbased classification. 32 The Washington Supreme Court found
no equal protection violation. 33

29 See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1137. Purs~ant to The Washington Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, "procedures ... shall be developed and promulgated by the correctional agency having jurisdiction in which the offender is confined." Wash. Rev. Code
9.94A.150(1).

30
3t

See id.
See id.

32

••

See In re Mota, 788 P.2d 538, 543 (1990) (cltmg State v. Phelan, 671 P.2d 1212
(1983». Intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review based on the
Washington Supreme Court's prior decisions that people who are deprived of a liberty
interest due to indigency comprise a semi-suspect class. A semi-suspect class is a
group that is sometimes subjected to invidious discrimination based on unfounded
stereotypes, thus deserving more than mere rational basis review, but is at other
times subjected to disparate treatment based on actual characteristics that the state
may legitimately recognize, thus deserving less than full-blown strict scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny requires that any disparate treatment of members of a semi-suspect
class must be substantially-related to an important government objective. See generally Craig v. Boren, 427 U.S. 190 (1976). The Washington Supreme Court determined
that in some cases the poor are a semi-suspect class: "The poor, while not a suspect
class, are not fully accountable for their status." See In re Mota at 543 (citing State v.
Phelan, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983». "Situations involving discrete classes not accountable
for their status invoke intermediate scrutiny." See id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982».
33

See id. The Washington Supreme Court held that the disparate treatment of
pre-trial detainees was justified by the state's important interest in "maintaining
prisoner discipline, particularly by preventing flight from prosecution and preserving
local control over jails." The Court also found no due process violation, because the
county jails established and followed written early-release policies consistent with due
process requirements. See id. at 727. Nor were petitioners put at risk of double jeopardy, because their claims of multiple punishment could not be supported just by
speculation that more early-release credits might have been earned under a different
system. See id. (citing State v. Phelan, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983».

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss1/9

6

Benesis: Criminal Procedure

2000]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

173

Upon denial of their state personal restraint petitions,
Macfarlane and Fogle filed habeas corpus petitions in the
United States District Court for the Western District of
34
Washington in August 1996. Their petitions were again con35
solidated. The respondent county jails moved for summary
judgment.36 The district court granted summary judgment,
holding that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate stan37
dard under federallaw. Macfarlane and Fogle appealed the
3s
summary judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
III.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS

Pursuant to the Federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the Ninth Circuit could not
grant Macfarlane's and Fogle's petitions for Federal habeas
corpus relief unless the Washington Supreme Court's decision
on their state personal restraint petitions was contrary to, or
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law
as determined by the United States Supreme. Court. 39 The
Ninth Circuit found the Supreme Court decision in Bearden v.

34

See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1137. A petition for habeas corpus, a Latin phrase
meaning "you should have the body," is brought by a prisoner and requests an audience before the court for the purpose of determining whether the petitioner's imprisonment is illegal. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner ed., West Publ'g Co.
1996).

35
See id.
36
See id.
37

See id. at 1137-1138. Because the Washington Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny, the U.S. district court assumed the decision was consistent with clearly
established federal law in Bearden v. Georgia, which also applied intermediate scrutiny. See Bearden, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
3S

See id. at 1138.

39 See Macfarlane v. Walter, 179 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 1999). The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act amended 28 U.S.C.A. §2254(d)(1) to
provide: "An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was alljudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States." See 28 U.S.C.A. §2254(d)(1).
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40

Georgia to be clearly established Federal law. Although the
defendant in Bearden was incarcerated for defaulting on a fine,
rather than for failing to post bail, the Ninth Circuit in
Macfarlane reasoned that both situations involve indigent
criminal defendants subjected to incarceration where wealthier
criminal defendants would not be. 41 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
held that the balancing test in Bearden governs whether incarceration imposed solely for lack of financial resources violates
42
equal protection ofthe law.
In accordance with Bearden, a court must weigh four factors when faced with an equal protection claim alleging disparate treatment by the criminal justice system due to indigency:
first, the nature of the individual interest affected; second, the
extent to which the individual interest is affected; third, the
rationality of the connection between legislative means and
purpose; and fourth, the existence of alternative means for ef43
fectuating the purpose. Here, because Macfarlane and Fogle
were subjected to longer periods of incarceration, the individual interest affected is liberty.44 Because physical liberty is a
fundamental interest protected by the United States Constitu-

40

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 662·663 (1983). The defendant in Bearden was
sentenced to probation, payment of a fine, and restitution after pleading guilty to
burglary and theft by receiving stolen property. He defaulted in payment of the fine
and restitution because he was indigent. The court found he had no income or assets
during the period when payments were due, and he was unable to find work despite
bona fide efforts. The defendant's probation was revoked for failure to pay the fine
and restitution, and he was sentenced to serve the duration of his probation in prison.
The Georgia Court of Appeals found no equal protection violation in imprisoning
Bearden for failure to pay the fine, and the Georgia Supreme Court denied review.
See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 662·663. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that imprisonment of a probationer solely for financial inability to pay a fine is uncon·
stitutional unless no alternate means exist to meet the state's interest in crime pun·
ishment and deterrence. See id. 461 U.S. at 672.

41
See Macfarlane,
42
See id. at 1140.
43

179 F.3d at 1139.

See id. at 1139 (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983». See also
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
44

See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1141. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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tion, depriving someone of liberty to any extent in violation of
45
the Constitution is intolerable.
The State of Washington asserted that county jails need
different good behavior credit systems than state prisons to
maintain prisoner discipline and preserve local control of
county jails.46 However, the Ninth Circuit found no rational
connection between the discrepancy in good behavior credits
47
and maintaining prisoner discipline. Further, prisoner discipline is already maintained by alternative means. 48 The Ninth
Circuit also found no rational connection between the discrepancy in good behavior credits and preserving local control of
county jails.49 Instead of certifying the number of early-release
credits a pre-trial detainee earned in county jail, local authorities could certify the total number of days spent in county jail
and the number of days of good behavior. 50 Once the prisoner
is transferred to state prison, the DOC could award earlyrelease credits for the number of days of good behavior in
county jail. 51 The Ninth Circuit thus ordered the Washington
Department of Corrections to calculate the number of good behavior credits Macfarlane and Fogle would have received un-

45

46

See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1141. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XN.
See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1141-1142.

47 See id. at 1142. The Ninth Circuit noted that the goal of maintaining prisoner
discipline through good behavior would rationally be advanced by offering more good
behavior credits, or at least by offering equal good behavior credits to all inmates. The
goal of maintaining prisoner discipline was not advanced by offering less good behavior
credits to pre-trial detainees. See id.
48

See id. Good behavior credits already achieve prisoner discipline, not because of
the way the credits are calculated, but because credits are awarded to prisoners who
demonstrate good behavior and are denied to prisoners who misbehave. See id.
49

'

See id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, since pre-trial detainees will be transferred to state prison if convicted, the amount of good behavior credits inmates ultimately receive after transfer to state prison has no affect on local control of county
jails. County jails determine what constitutes good behavior and whether a pre-trial
detainee in their custody has earned it, but they have no rational interest in the total
number of good behavior credits an inmate receives after being transferred to state
prison. See id.
50

See id.

51 See Macfarlane, 179 F.3d at 1142. The credits would be calculated using the
DOC early-release credit system that applies to state prisoners. See id.
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der the state prison system and to reduce their sentences by
that amount. 52
The State of Washington also asserted that county jails
need different good performance credit systems than state
prisons to protect community safety, preclude risk of flight,
53
and, again, to preserve local control of county jails.
The
Ninth Circuit found a strong rational connection between the
State's concerns and the good performance policies excluding
pre-trial detainees from participation in off-site programs. 54
Further, the Ninth Circuit found no practicable alternative
means to protect community safety and preclude risk of flight
while allowing pre-trial detainees to participate in off-site programs. 55 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that denial of good
performance credits to pre-trial detainees in county jail does
not violate the equal protection clause. 56 Macfarlane and Fogle
thus did not receive adjustments to their sentences for good
57
performance credits they might have earned in county jail.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION

The Ninth Circuit decision seems just in light of its choice
of Bearden as controlling law. However, other circuits that
have decided similar equal protection claims have not found

52
53

.

See Id. at 1143.
.

See Id.

54

See id. The Ninth Circuit recognized that excluding pre-trial detainees from
work, education, or treatment programs away from jail is rationally related to community safety because pre-trial detainees comprise a more dangerous prison population than post-trial county jail inmates who were sentenced for relatively minor
crimes. Not al\owing pre-trial detainees to participate in off-site programs is also
rationally related to mitigating risk of flight, as pre-trial detainees may be more likely
to risk an escape than post-trial county jail inmates serving relatively short sentences.
Finally, unlike the counties' good behavior policies, the good performance policies are
rationally related to preserving local control because good performance credits are
earned by participating in work, education, or treatment programs which are funded
and administered locally.
55
.
See td.
56
57

See Macfarlane. 179 F.3d at 1143.
.

See td.
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Bearden to control. 58 The First and Tenth Circuits found
59
McGinnis v. Royster to control the issue of whether denying
good behavior credits to pre-trial detainees violates equal protection. 60 Based on the rational basis test used in McGinnis,
both the First and Tenth circuits held that denying good be-

58 See Lemieux v. Kerby, 931 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1991). In Lemieux, a state prisoner's Federal habeas corpus petition claimed that New Mexico's· sentencing scheme
violated equal protection by denying good behavior credits to pre-trial detainees too
poor to post bail. See id. at 1392. The alleged equal protection violation was similar
to that alleged in Macfarlane, except that New Mexico completely denied both good
behavior and good performance credits to pre-trial detainees, whereas Washington
offered less good behavior credits and completely denied only good performance credits
to pre-trial detainees. See id. The Tenth Circuit held that New Mexico's asserted
purpose of offering good behavior and good performance credits in order to rehabilitate
criminals was rationally related to denying credits to pre-trial detainees because rehabilitation is not warranted until after a person has been convicted. See id. at 1393.
The court based its decision on McGinnis v. Royster, where the United States Supreme
Court held that an equal protection claim brought by pre-trial detainees who were
denied good behavior credits for their presentence incarceration was subject only to
rational basis scrutiny and that the state's interest in rehabilitating criminals was
rationally related to reserving good behavior credits as a tool of post-sentence rehabilitation. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 2701 273 (1973). In Lemieux, the Tenth
Circuit specifically rejected the petitioner's assertion that McGinnis was overruled by
Bearden. See Lemieux at 1393 n.4. See also Chestnut v. Magnusson, 942 F.2d 820 (1st
Cir. 1991). In Chestnut, the First Circuit applied McGinnis to an equal protection
claim brought by an indigent pre-trial detainee and held that Maine's denial of good
behavior credits to pre-trial detainees did not violate equal protection. See id. at 824.
The court specifically stated that indigency does not create a class calling for strict
scrutiny. See id. Although Lemieux and Chestnut were both decided well after
Bearden, it is significant that neither decision found Bearden to be applicable.

.

~

McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
60

See McGinnis, 410 U.S. at 270-273. In McGinnis, the United States Supreme
Court decided an equal protection claim brought by pre-trial detainees who were denied good behavior credits for pre-sentence time served in county jail. Based on New
York's asserted purpose of awarding good behavior credits as part of its criminal rehabilitation program, the Court held it was rational to deny credits to pre-trial detainees
because no systematic rehabilitation programs exist in county jails, and detainees
merely awaiting trial should not be subject to rehabilitation. See id. Notably, the
McGinnis decision seems not to be based on indigency. Although the prisoners in
McGinnnis were unable to post bail, and they alleged they were treated differently
than "those fortunate enough to obtain bail prior to sentence," the Court framed the
issue in terms of whether denying good behavior credits for time served before trial
"violates the equal protection of the laws and discriminates against those state prisoners unable to afford or otherwise qualify for bail prior to trial." See McGinnis, 410
U.S. at 268. (emphasis added). Without basing its decision on indigency, there was no
reason for the Court to apply any test other than rational basis scrutiny. McGinnis
also was not a Federal habeas corpus petition, so no statement of clearly established
law was required. See McGinnis, 410 U.S. at 265 n.2.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 9

178 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1

havior credits to indigent pre-trial detainees does not violate
equal protection. 61
Among the Federal Courts of Appeals, the Ninth Circuit
stands alone in citing Bearden to hold that an early.;release
credit system offering less good behavior credits to indigent
pre-trial detainees violates equal protection of the law. 62 The·
Ninth Circuit's divergence from other circuits leads one to believe that there is no controlling law.
The threshold question in a federal habeas corpus proceeding brought by a state prisoner is whether the prior decision in
the state court habeas proceeding was contrary to "clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States."s3 Inconsistency among the federal circuits

61

See McGinnis, 410 U.S. at 270. The Court did not recognize a suspect class and
held that the "determination of an optimal time for parole eligibility ... require[s] only
some rational basis to sustain [it]."
62

The Ninth Circuit cites Bearden as controlling law on the issue of whether
awarding less early-release credits to pre-trial detainees in county jail than to other
state prisoners violates equal protection of the law. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S.
660 (1983). Other circuits cite McGinnis v. Royster as controlling law on the same
issue. In Bearden, the Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny to an equal protection claim based on indigency and held that revoking probation solely for financial
inability to pay a fine violates equal protection of the law. Like Macfarlane, the decision in Bearden was based on indigency, but Bearden was not about awarding less
early-release credits to pre-trial detainees. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672. McGinnis,
however, was an equal protection claim brought by pre-trial detainees who were denied good behavior credits for pre-sentence time served in county jail. See McGinnis,
410 U.S. at 264-265. Although the facts were similar to those in Macfarlane, the Supreme Court in McGinnis did not base its decision on indigency. See McGinnis, 410
U.S. at 268. Finding no suspect class, the Court applied the rational basis test and
held that denying good behavior credits to pre-trial detainees who had not yet been
convicted of a crime was rationally related to the state's purpose of awarding good
behavior credits only as part of its criminal rehabilitation program. See McGinnis, 410
U.S. at 268-273. The choice between Bearden or McGinnis as controlling law thus
appears to depend on whether the issue is framed as denial of early-release credits to
indigents who cannot afford to post bail, or denial of early-release credits to pre-trial
detainees, whether their inability to post bail is due to indigency or to some other
reason.
63
See 28 U.S.C.A. §2254(d)(1). ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
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as to which Supreme Court case is clearly established law undermines any threshold determination that the state court decision was contrary to clearly established law. It would not be
unreasonable for a state to argue that there is no clearly established federal law, and therefore, the federal habeas corpus
petition should fail. The Supreme Court should swiftly intervene due to the inconsistent decisions within the circuits. Until the Supreme Court intervenes to decide which circuit is correct, it remains to be seen whether Bearden or McGinnis, or
neither, is clearly established federal law on the issue of
whether there is an equal protection violation when less earlyrelease credits are awarded to pre-trial detainees who spend
time in county jail because they cannot afford to post bail.
Jennifer Benesis"
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